The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act by Leahy, James E.
North Dakota Law Review 
Volume 29 Number 3 Article 3 
1953 
The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act 
James E. Leahy 
Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Leahy, James E. (1953) "The North Dakota Marketable Record Title Act," North Dakota Law Review: Vol. 
29 : No. 3 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://commons.und.edu/ndlr/vol29/iss3/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at UND Scholarly Commons. It has 
been accepted for inclusion in North Dakota Law Review by an authorized editor of UND Scholarly Commons. For 
more information, please contact und.commons@library.und.edu. 
THE NORTH DAKOTA MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
THE NORTH DAKOTA MARKETABLE RECORD
TITLE ACT
JAMES E. LEAHY*
A RTICLE II, Section 67 of the North Dakota Constitution pro-
vides that acts of the legislative assembly shall take effect the
first day of July after the close of the session unless the legislature
shall vote otherwise. Thus Chapter 280 of the Session Laws of
1951, entitled the "Marketable Record Title" act became law on
July 1, 1951, that being the first day of July after the close of the
1951 session. For all practical purposes, however, the "Marketing
Record Title" act, hereinafter referred to as "the Act," did not
become effective until July 1, 1952. This is because the Act itself
extends the time until one year from the effective date of the Act
for the filing of notices and affidavits of possession provided for
therein.1
In view of the fact that the Act has therefore only been in effect
one year, it seems proper that it be discussed and evaluated
at this time.
THE DECLARED PURPOSE OF THE ACT
The act, in section 10 thereof, sets forth the legislative purpose
in enacting it as follows:
"Purpose of Act. This act shall be construed to effectuate the
legislative purpose of simplifying and facilitating real estate
transactions by allowing persons to deal with the record title
owner as defined herein and to rely upon the record title
covering a period of thirty years or more subsequent to the
recording of deed of conveyance as set out in section 1 of this
act, and to that end to bar all claims that affect or may affect
the interest thus dealt with, the existence of which claims
arises out of or depends upon any act, transaction, event, or
omission occurring before the recording to (of) such deed of
conveyance, unless a notice of such claim, as provided in sec-
tion 5, shall have been duly filed for record. The claims hereby
barred shall mean any and all interests of any nature what-
ever, however denominated, whether such claims are asserted
by a person sui juris or under disability, whether such person
is or has been within or without the state, and whether such
person is natural, corporate, private, or governmental." 2
In analyzing this, it is clear that the legislature intended to
enact a law which is, in effect, a statute of limitation to run against
old claims to real estate of any nature and however denominated,
Of the firm of Cupler, Tenneson, Serkland & Leahy, Fargo, N.D.
1. N.D. Sess. L. 1951, c. 280 §3.
2. Id., §10.
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whether they be recorded or not. It is the declared purpose of
the Act that if the owner of real property is a record title owner as
defined in Section 2 of the Act, such record title owner need only
rely on the record for a period of thirty years prior to the date of
the examination of the record. It is the purpose of the Act" . . .
to bar all claims that affect or may affect the interest" 3 of the
record title owner, "the existence of which arises out of or depends
upon any act, transaction, event or determination occurring before
the recording" of the thirty-year-old instrument upon which the
record title owner bases his title.
The act, however, gives to the claim holder a method of pre-
serving his claim by the recording of a notice within the thirty year
period under which title is claimed by the record title owner. ',
Further, in declaring the purpose of the Act, the legislature states
definitely what claims are barred. They are "any and all interests
of any nature, however denominated, whether such claims are as-
serted by a person sui juris or under disability, whether such person
is or has been within or without the state, and whether such person
is natural, corporate, private or governmental." 6
WILL THE ACT ACCOMPLISH ITS PURPOSE?
Because the use of dates and periods of time is essential to the
discussion of whether the act will accomplish its purpose, it is
important to note that an inconsistency has crept into the act with
regard to measuring the periods of time.
In Section 1 of the Act, a person is declared to have a market-
able title if he "has an unbroken chain of title to any real estate
by himself or his immediate or remote grantors under a deed of
conveyance which has been recorded for a period of thirty years
or longer. . ." 7
Section 2 of the act uses thirty years as a measuring period, in
defining an unbroken chain of title. The thirty year period is also
used in Section 10 in declaring the purpose of the act to be
"simplifying and facilitating real estate title transactions by allow-
ing persons to deal with the record title owner as herein defined
and to rely upon the record title covering a period of thirty years
or more.
It will be noted, however, that while the first part of Section 3
3. Ibid.
4. Id.
5. Id. §§3, 10
6. Id., §10.
7. Id., §1.
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of the act purports to allow the title holder and his successors to
take the land free and clear of any claims, the existence of which
depends upon an event that occurred thirty years or more ago, the
last part of Section 3 qualifies this in that if a claimant records
a notice of claim on or before thirty-one years from the date of the
recording of the conveyance under which title is claimed or within
one year from the effective date of the act, whichever is latest in
point of time, that the claim is not barred by the statute. Thus,
section 3 purports to allow one to deal with the record title owner
who is in possession and holds under a thirty year chain of title,
yet at the same time allows a claimant thirty-one years in which
to file a notice of claim. It is therefore the opinion of the writer
that the time for filing notices as set forth in the last part of Section
3 should have been thirty years in order to harmonize with the
rest of the Act.
Undoubtedly, what the legislature had in mind was the creation
of a reasonable length of time during which to allow the filing of
notices of claim before claims were barred. However, the legis-
lature did provide this period of time by allowing claims to be
filed "within one year from the effective date of this Act. .. " 8 and
it was not necessary to use the figure thirty-one in the phrase "on
or before thirty-one years from the date of the recording of deed
or conveyance under which title is claimed. .. "
By allowing claims to be filed thirty-one years from the date of
the conveyance under which title is claimed, the legislature has
actually extended the time used in Sections 1, 2 and 10.
Under Sections 1, 2, 10 and the first part of sectioIC8, one dealing
with the owner in possession need only go back thirty years. Sup-
pose that one is dealing with Richard Roe, an owner in possession,
and the present date is July 15, 1952. It is necessary only to check
back to see if he has an unbroken chain of title as defined in Section
2 for thirty years, thus back to July 15, 1922. If Richard Roe is in
possession and has an unbroken chain of title, then under the first
part of section 3, he can convey his title free and clear of any claims
that arose more than thirty years ago. Suppose, however, that on
February 1, 1922, an event took place giving rise to a claim in
John Doe. Doe has done nothing about it. His claim is more than
thirty years old. Is it barred by the Act? Section 1, 2, 10 and the
first part of Section 3 seem to say so, but the last part of Section 3
allows John Doe to file a notice in writing on or before thirty-one
8. Id., 13.
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years from the date of recording of the conveyance under which
title is claimed. Richard Roe claims title under a deed of convey-
ance recorded on July 15, 1922. Thirty-one years from that date
will be July 15, 1958. Thus, John Doe has until that date to file
his notice of claim. In dealing with Richard Roe, therefore, reli-
ance cannot be placed upon his thirty-year chain of title. One must
wait thirty-one years to escape the effect of the last part of Section
3 of the Act.
As pointed out heretofore, two different times are given within
which a notice of claim may be filed. The last part of Section 3
provides for the filing of the notice (1) on or before 31 years from
the date of the recording of the deed of conveyance under which
title is claimed or (2) within one year from the effective date of
the act, whichever event is latest in point of time. It must be
noted, however, that after July 1, 1952, which is one year from the
effective date of the act, the 31 year computation will always give
a date which is the latest in point of time where one is dealing with
a chain of title approximately 30 years in lengthY
In the illustration given, Richard Roe on July 15, 1952, had an
unbroken chain of title which stemmed from a deed of conveyance
recorded on July 15, 1922. In order to have the act be effective
and give to Richard Roe a marketable title, he must have an un-
broken chain of title for 30 years and be in possession of the real
estate. In dealing with him, purchasers will want to have some
evidence of his possession and Section 7 of the Act provides for
the recording of such affidavit of possession. However, the Section
further states that "no such affidavits of possession shall be filed
as to any real estate before the expiration of 31 years from the
recording of deed of conveyance under which title is claimed, or
before one year after the effective date of this act, whichever event
is the latest in point of time, .... ". Can Richard Roe on July 15,
1952 file such affidavits of possession? No, he can not. He must
wait until 31 years from July 15, 1922, which is the date of the
recording of the deed of conveyance under which he claims title.1
Thus, he must wait until July 15, 1953 before he can record said
affidavit because that is the latest in point of time. Therefore, in
the opinion of the writer, attorneys cannot safely use the 30 year
9. In dealing with a title based upon a conveyance 32 years or more prior to July
1, 1952, then of course the application of one year from the effective date of the Act
will be the latest in point of time. However, as pointed out above, where dealing with
chains of title only 30 or 31 years old, the application of the 31-year figure will give
the latest date in point of time.
10. N.D. Sess. L. 1951, c. 280, §7.
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period as mentioned in Sections 1, 2, 3 (first part) and 10. Prac-
titioners must use the 31 year period in order to be sure that there
will be no claims which can be preserved by filing notices thereof.
The 31 year time limitation must also be used in filing affidavits
of possession.
In view of the differences in time limitations, it is the opinion
of the writer that wherever the figure 31 has been used, the Act
should be changed to read 30 and then all sections of the Act will
be consistent. If the figure 30 were used in the last part of Section
3 and in Section 7, the following would be the result of our illustra-
tion. Richard Roe on July 15, 1952 would have an unbroken chain
of title back to July 15, 1922. Within 30 years from July 15, 1922,
notices of claims would have had to have been filed. Thus, on July
16, 1952 the 30 year time for filing claims would expire and it is
to be noted that date is later in point of time than one year
after the effective date of the act. Thus, on July 16, 1952, all claims
which arose prior to July 15, 1922 would have been barred. Note
also, if 30 years were used in Section 7, that on July 16, 1952, Mr.
Roe could file for record the affidavit provided for in Section 7
because the date of the beginning of Mr. Roe's title is July 15,
1922 and using 30 years allows him to record such affidavits on
July 16, 1952.
With the exception of inconsistencies heretofore set forth, the
writer is of the opinion that the Act will serve the purposes outlined
in Section 10. The Act not only acts as a statute of limitations but
also sets forth what constitutes a marketable title.11 This, it is
believed, will go a long way to facilitate and simplify title transac-
tions. It is a positive statement of what a marketable title is.
According to the Act, a person is deemed to have a marketable
title whenever he has an unbroken chain of title to any interest in
real estate for a period of 30 (31) years subject only to claims and
defects of which notice has been filed within that period of time,
and of course subject to claims that are less than 30 (31) years old,
and are of record or known to the person dealing with the record
title holder.
While other states have similar statutes, no cases have been found
which set forth the types of claims that are barred by these statutes.
However, according to the Act itself, all interests, claims or any
charges whatever dependent in whole or in part upon any event
that occurred more than 30 (31) years ago are barred.12 This in-
11. Id., §I.
12. Id., §§), 10.
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cludes claims or charges asserted by persons under disability with-
out regard to residence in the state or whether the person asserting
the claim is natural, corporate, private or governmental."3 In view
of the strong language used in Sections 3 and 10 there seems to
be no doubt that the legislature intended to bar all types of claims
more than 30 (31) years old, except those specifically excepted in
Section 11.
Assuming that the person who holds the record title is in pos-
session and has an unbroken chain of title for 30 (31) years, the
writer believes that the following claims will be barred:
(1) A claim arising under tax title which is more than 30 (31)
years old.
(2) A defective quiet title action, mortgage foreclosure, probate
proceeding, or sale under a judgment.
(3) A deed executed by a husband or wife only without stating
that it does not cover a homestead.
(4) Informalities in the execution or acknowledgement of con-
veyances.
(5) Interests which are present or future, vested or contingent
with the exception of the reversionary interest of a lessor or his
successor and the rights of remaindermen upon expiration of a
life estate or trust created prior to the date of the recording of
the conveyance under which title is claimed. 4
The case of Lane v. Travelers Insurance Company,15 sheds light
on the construction of the type of statute under discussion when
applied to barring contingent future interests. In the Lane case the
testator devised his land to his son, Patrick, for life with a remain-
der to Patrick's heirs.16 Patrick mortgaged the land in 1906, which
mortgage was foreclosed and a sheriff's deed issued in 1910. In
1913, the land then pased through several conveyances to Margaret
Lane, wife of Patrick. In 1926, Margaret and Patrick mortgaged
the property to the defendant and said mortgage was foreclosed
and a sheriff's deed issued to the defendant in February, 1938. Pat-
rick and Margaret's six children, all born prior to January 1, 1920,
sought to establish their interests in the property and commenced
the action on the day the sheriff's deed was issued to the defendant.
At that time Iowa had a statute which barred any claim arising or
13. Id., §10.
14. This list is not intended to be all-inclusive, but simply to call attention to the
more common defects found in chains of title.
15. 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941).
16. Iowa has abolished the rule in Shelley's Case by statute, and hence it did not
apply in this instance. Iowa Code §§10059, 10060 (1935).
THE NORTH DAKOTA MARKETABLE RECORD TITLE ACT
existing prior to January 1, 1920, unless a notice of claim was filed
on or before July 4, 1932. None of the children filed such notices
and 'in 1938 at the time of the institution of the action, two of the
children were minors. The question then arose as to whether the
statute barred the claims of the children of Patrick including the
two minor children. The Supreme Court of Iowa held that the in-
terests of all of the children arose prior to January 1, 1920, and that
in view of the fact that no notices thereof were filed prior to July
4, 1932, that-the interests of all the children were barred after that
date.
It is interesting to note that at the time of the institution of the
action in 1938, Patrick was still living, and therefore, the children's
interest were contingent remainders. Nevertheless, the court held
that the plain and unambiguous terms of the statute make it ap-
plicable to any interest or claim that arose or existed prior to
January 1, 1920, even though the holder of such interest or claim
was a minor.
If the situation in the Lane Case, arose in North Dakota, our
statute would not bar the plaintiff because Section 11, paragraph b
of the Act specifically excepts from the application thereof, "The
rights of any remainderman upon the expiration of any life estate
or trust created before the recording of deed of conveyance as set
out in section 1 of the act." Nevertheless the Lane Case is import-
ant in that in applying the Iowa statute, which is similar but not
identical with our Act, the holder of an interest is required to record
the notice even though he may be a minor or possibly not in exist-
ence at the expiration date for filing notices.
This same requirement is specifically set forth in our Act. The
Act provides that, "no disability nor lack of knowledge of any
kind on the part of anyone shall operate to extend the time for
filing such claims after the expiration of thirty-one years from the
recording of such deed of conveyance . . ." 17 Section 10 goes
further and states, "The claims hereby barred shall mean any and
all interests of any nature whatever, however denominated, whether
such claims are asserted by a person sui juris or under disability,
whether such person is or has been within or without the state,
and whether such person is natural, corporate, private, or govern-
mental." And should there be any doubt as to the barring of
claims of minors, persons under disabilities and even persons not
in existence, Section 4 should remove that doubt. The legislature,
17. N.D. Sess. L. 1951, c. 280, §3.
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realizing that minors, persons under disability, and even unborn
claimants will be unable to record the notice of their claim, allows
the notice to be filed, " . . . by any other person acting on behalf
of a claimant who is under disability, unable to assert a claim on
his own behalf, or one of a class but whose identity cannot be
established or is uncertain at the time of filing such claim for
record."
While the application of the Act may work a hardship in rare
occasions upon minors, unborn children or other persons under dis-
ability, nevertheless it is the opinion of the writer that in sacri-
ficing these claims, a public purpose is being served in facilitating
and simplifying land transactions. Furthermore, Section 4 gives to
parents and other relatives the right to file the claim to preserve
possible interests of their children or heirs.
As we have pointed out heretofore, this Act will serve the pur-
pose as set forth in Section 10 once the time of the limitations are
changed so that they are all the same. The Act will go a long way
to facilitate and simplify real estate transactions. However, it does
not go so far as to allow a title examiner to go back only thirty
years to commence his examination of the title. Because of the
exceptions contained in Section 11 of the Act, an examiner will still
have to go back to the origin of the title and examine down to date.
The Act merely provides that should there be interests, claims or
charges, more than thirty years old, the examiner may disregard
them provided that the record title holder is in possession and
gives an affidavit to that effect. And, of course, provided that the
interest, claim or charge is not excluded from the Act.
A consideration of the exclusions therefore seems warranted.
Section 11 provides: "11. Exceptions.) This Act shall not be:
1. Applied to bar:
a. The rights of any lessor or his successor as reversion-
ary of his right to possession on the expiration of any
lease by reason of failure to file the notice herein re-
quired;
b. The rights of any remainderman upon the expiration
of any life estate or trust created before the recording
of deed of conveyance as set out in section 1 of this
Act;
c. Rights founded upon any mortgage, trust deed, or con-
tract for sale of lands which is not barred by the statute
of limitations; or
d. Conditions subsequent contained in any deed; nor
2. Deemed to affect the right, title or interest of the state of
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North Dakota, or the United States, in any real estate in
North Dakota.
3. Applied to the right, title, or interest of any railroad."
At first glance, excluding a lessor from the requirement of filing
a notice of his interest, especially where the lease is for a long
term, appears to be a reasonable one. However, upon giving the
matter further thought, it is difficult to imagine a situation where
a lessor's reversionary interest could be cut off. It must be kept
in mind that two things are necessary in order that one have a
marketable title. They are (1) an unbroken chain of title for 30
(31) years, and (2) possession, evidenced by an affidavit thereof.
A lessee, of course, could give an affidavit of physical possession,
but it is difficult to imagine a situation where the lessee would have
an unbroken chain of title for 30 (31) years.'
In excluding from the operation of the Act, remaindermen who
will succeed to an interest in real estate upon the termination of
a life estate or trust, the legislature probably had in mind the Lane
case, discussed heretofore. Apparently the legislature felt that as
between the rights of remaindermen and the simplifying of real
estate transactions the rights of remaindermen were of greater im-
portance, even though the legislature did provide for the filing
of the notice of claim by any other person on behalf of a claimant
under disability or whose identity cannot be established. 19
In providing that holders of mortgages and trust deeds need not
file a notice of claim within the 30 (31) year period, it is apparent
that the legislature had in mind long term instruments and those
instruments which may have been extended by payments which do
not appear of record. Persons holding the above types of instru-
ments are thus protected from the operation of the Act.
20
The Act next provides that conditions subsequent in a deed shall
not be barred by the Act.2 1 This of course, means that if a deed
contains a condition subsequent, the person or persons to whom
the land would go upon the exercise of the right of entry need not
file a notice of their possible claim to the land. An example of this
situation is where land has been conveyed by "A to B, but if B
18. It is interesting to note that the Minnesota Act, Chapter 118 of the Session
Laws of 1947, which is more in the form of a statute of limitation, does not contain any
provision excluding a lessor from the operation of the statute. Commenting on this, Paul
E. Basye states, "Presumably the owner of land subject to a lease for more than 40 years
would not need to coFnply with the act and record notice of his reversionary interest,
since the physical possession of the lessee would be treated as the possession of the lessor."
Bayse, Streamtining 'Conveyancing Procedure, 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1117 (1949).
19. N.D. Sess. L. 1951, c. 2.80, §4.
20. Id., §il (1) (c).
21. Id., ill (1) (d).
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should cease to use the land as a park, A may reenter as of his
former estate." In view of the fact that as time passes, circum-
stances surrounding the use of certain property may change, and
it may be advantageous to use the property for a different pur-
pose, it is the opinion 'of the writer that interests created by con-
ditions subsequent should be brought within the operation of the
Act and barred unless a notice of the claim were filed in accord-
ance with the Act.2 2 There should be some way to bar these in-
terest that arise upon a condition broken, where the land is no
longer suitable for the purpose for which it was granted, and where
the deed creating the condition was made many years ago. It is
many times difficult and sometimes impossible to locate the per-
son or persons to whom the land passes upon a condition being
broken. To require these persons to keep alive their interests by
filing a notice of claim within the 30 (31) year period, would seem
to the writer another step toward the goal of facilitating and sim-
plifying real estate transactions.
23
Paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section 11 of the Act exclude the govern-
ments of the State of North Dakota and of the United States from
the operation of the Act, and also any railroad. Thus if any of these
three have an interest in the property which appears of record, and
is more than 30 (31) years old, the Act does not bar that interest.
CONSTITUTIONALITY
The Act, in effect, is a statute of limitations, although it goes
further in that it not only bars existing claims more than 30 (31)
years old, but also defines what constitutes a marketable title. There
is no question but that the legislature has the power to enact
statutes of limitations. Thus there is no need to discuss that here.
As to existing causes of action, or as in this Act, as to existing claims,
a statute of limitation must afford a reasonable time for the com-
mencement of the action, or as in this Act, for the filing of a
notice of claim before the action or claim is barred. What is a
reasonable time is to be decided from all the facts. In Merchants
National Bank of Bismarck v. Braithwaite,24 our Supreme court
held that 13 months from the date of the passage of an act was a
reasonable length of time within which an action must be com-
22. It will be noted that the act does not, in terms, except from its operation possi-
bilities of reverter remaining after the grant of a determinable fee.
23. See Ruemmele, How to Examine an Abstract and Implications of the Marketable
Titles Act, 1952 Sectional Assemblies Booklet of the State Bar Association of North Da-
kota.
24. 7 N.D. 358, 75 N.W. 244 (1898).
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menced. The Marketable Record Title act, which we are dis-
cussing, allows one year from the effective date of the Act within
which to file a notice of claim. This is more than 15 months from
the date of the passage of the Act, and therefore a reasonable time
is allowed before existing claims are barred, and thus the Act meets
that constitutional requirement.
The question of whether the Act affords due process must also
be considered in discussing the constitutionality thereof. In Murri-
son v. Fenstermacher,25 the Supreme Court of Kansas held uncon-
stitutional a statute which provided that, where a parcel of land
had been platted for twenty-five years or more, deeds executed by
the person who platted the property should be conclusively pre-
sumed to have conveyed perfect title, notwithstanding any prior
defect in the grantor's title. The court based its holding of un-
constitutionality on the ground that the statute operated to cut off
rights, even of those people who may be in actual or constructive
possession of the property. In other words, the statute cut off in-
terests to platted property, more than 25 years old, regardless of
whether the person in whose favor the statute operated was in or
out of possession.
In view of the fact that our Act provides that a person must be
in possession of the property besides having an unbroken chain of
title, our Act meets the constitutional requirement set up by the
Murrison case, and the cases cited therein.
The question of due process is discussed also in the Iowa case of
Swanson v. Pontralo.26 In that case the Supreme Court of Iowa
points out that the legislature by a "curative" act cannot cure a jur-
isdictional defect, such as in a tax sale, because to do so would be
a violation of due process. However, the court distinguishes be-
tween "curative" acts and "statutes of limitation" and states that
the legislature can bar the right to assert a jurisdictional defect by
one who is not in possession of the realty, without violating due
process. Before the jurisdictional defect can be barred, however,
the one relying on it must have a reasonable time within which
to assert his claim, and he must not be in possession of the property.
If the one relying on the jurisdictional defect is in possession of
the realty, or if he is not accorded a reasonable time within which
to assert it, to deprive him of it would be a violation of due process.
Again, applying those rules to our Act, it is apparent that a claim
holder is given a reasonable time within which to assert his claim,
25. 166 Kan. 568, 203 P.2d 160 (1949):
26. 238 Iowa 693, 27 N.W.2d 21 (1947).
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and further, he cannot be deprived of his rights if he is in posses-
sion of the property. Thus the Act also meets the constitutional
requirements of the Swanson case.
No cases have been found which directly hold constitutional a
statute similar to our Act. However, the Swanson case, referred to
above, does shed some light on the question because in that case
the Iowa court held constitutional a statute, which operates on tax
titles alone in a way similar to the way in which our Act will oper-
ate on them and on other defects. The Iowa statute, which was
construed in the Swanson case, allowed a tax title holder, after two
years, to record an affidavit setting forth his purchase from the
county and the fact that he was in possession of the property.
Upon the recording of that affidavit, anyone claiming adversely
to the tax title holder had 120 days within which to file a notice of
his claim. This statute was held constitutional, and it is interesting
to note that the Iowa court refers to the Lane case, referred to
above, pointing out that while the parties in the Lane case did not
attack the validity of the statute under discussion therein,27 the
court did say that ". . . there can be little doubt of the desirability
of the statutes giving greater effect and stability to record titles." 28
Thus it would seem that the Swanson case and the Lane case should
have a great deal of influence on our Supreme Court, once the con-
stitutionality of the Act is before them.
CONCLUSION
The Marketable Record Title act has as its purpose the simplify-
ing and facilitating of real estate transactions. This purpose will
be accomplished, if the members of the bar will study the Act and
make use of its provisions. However, the Act does not mean that
an examiner need only examine back for a period of 30 (31) years.
The record must be examined back to its origin. Should the exam-
iner find a defect therein which is more than 30 (31) years old,
and which is not excluded by Section 11, said defect will be barred
if the record title holder has an unbroken chain of title for a period
of 30 (31) years and makes and files an affidavit that he is in pos-
session of the property.
The Act bars all interests, claims or any charges whatever, which
are more than 30 (31) years old. Thus the Act will not only cure
irregularities and informalities in instruments and proceedings, but
27. The statute applied in the- Lane' case is similar to our own act.
28. Swanson v. Pontralo, 238 Iowa 27 N.W.2d 21 (1947); Lane v. Travelers
Insurance Co., 230 Iowa 973, 299 N.W. 553 (1941).
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will bar jurisdictional defects in legal proceedings more than 30
(31) years old.
The Act of course, does not operate to bar the exclusions listed
in Section 11. As indicated above, some of these exclusions could
well be modified so as to bring them within the operation of the
Act, and thus make the Act more useful. The enactment of this
law, however, is a forward step in the march to streamline convey-
ancing procedure.
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